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THE UNDERLYING ECONOMICS OF THE SOUTH
CHINA SEA CONFLICT
Christopher Stock*
The countries of southeastern Asia and China are currently in a
territorial dispute over the Spratly and Paracel island chains in the
South China Sea. The South China Sea encompasses roughly 1.4
million square miles of the Pacific Ocean, spanning throughout most
of southeastern Asia.1 A majority of the islands located within the sea
are uninhabited and have never had an indigenous population, which
makes it nearly impossible to track the lineage to determine
sovereignty over the islands. Because there has never been an
indigenous population on a majority of the islands, there are now
competing claims for many of the same pieces of land.2
There are four main territorial disputes at issue: (1) China claims
the “nine-dash line” area, which encompasses the southern province
of Hainan, the Paracel island chain, and Spratly island chain; (2)
Vietnam claims sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly island chains;
(3) the Philippines claim the Spratly islands based on their
geographical proximity to the chain; (4) Malaysia and Brunei claim
territory they believe to be in their economic exclusion zones, as laid
out by the United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).3
The purpose of this paper will be to examine the underlying economics
behind the fisheries, shipping lanes, and natural resources highlighting
South China Sea’s role in the industrialization of Asia.
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Ambiguity of UNCLOS
Each country in southeastern Asia is making legal claims for the
disputed archipelagoes within the South China Sea. China is claiming
the most land, the nine-dash line area, which consumes nearly all of
the South China Sea.4 China believes they have a right to the area
based on their survey expeditions, fishing activities, and naval patrols,
which allegedly date back to the fifteenth century.5 Under the
UNCLOS agreement, which China rejects, each littoral state is allowed
to claim an Exclusive Economic Zone of 320 km, or a continental
shelf, around their island.6 Under the UNCLOS guidelines, China’s
nine-dash line area claim would be invalid.
Unfortunately, the UNCLOS guidelines are not clear in defining
island boundaries because there are an additional twelve kilometers of
territory that can be included in the country’s geography based on
different aquatic features.7 UNCLOS also fails to specifically state
what happens when an island lies in multiple countries’ territory.
Although it may seem UNCLOS would solve the dispute by laying
specific boundaries for each country, instead, UNCLOS further
complicates the dispute between the countries. The ambiguity of
UNCLOS has opened the door for China to intimidate and dominate
these smaller island nations. Through its size and vast economy, China
is able to control the South China Sea in regards to fishing, shipping,
and natural resources.
The Fisheries
Fishing is an integral part to the economies of southeastern Asia
and China. Nearly 1.5 billion people live along the border of the South
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China Sea and rely on fishing for food and income.8 The fishing zone
in the South China Sea ranks fourth out of the nineteen fisheries around
the world in total maritime production.9 The area regularly produces
approximately 10% of the worldwide commercial fishing catch.10
However, the unregulated fishing in the waters around the Paracel and
Spratly archipelagoes is quickly depleting fish populations and
destroying plant and reef life.11 The depleted fish populations have
forced fishermen to take longer trips and travel farther from their
homes in search of fish. The competition between countries for the
most valuable fisheries has led to more clashing between foreign
fishing boats. Many countries, in particular China, have been placing
annual bans and have been arresting foreign fishermen in waters they
believe to be their own.12 By taking these actions against foreign
fishermen, China is indirectly asserting sovereign control over the
area.13 In a recent fishing dispute, a Chinese boat struck a Vietnamese
boat, causing the boat to eventually sink.14
These conflicts have the potential to deter fishermen from the
South China Sea, many of whom have no other skills. If this trend
continues, the economies of the region would undoubtedly suffer
because the region relies so heavily on fishing as the foundation of the
economy.
The Shipping Lanes
The South China Sea serves as a corridor for much of the world’s
shipping, thus, it is essential to China, southeastern Asia, and the world
for this territorial dispute to be resolved in order to ensure free
navigation. The reason this area is of paramount importance is
8.
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available at http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/world/20070904-0245-philippinesfishing-.html.
LAGUE, supra note 4.
EVA PEISOVA, Issue Alerts: The South Sea’s Commons: Behind and beyond
sovereignty disputes, 30 EUROPEAN UNION INST. FOR SECURITY STUDIES 1 (2014),
available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_30_South_China_Sea.pdf.
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because, of the top ten shipping ports in the world, more than half are
located there, and nearly fifty percent of all oil tankers pass through
this region.15 There are roughly one and a half billion people who live
within 100 miles of the South China Sea, and the volume of shipping
through the South China Sea has greatly increased due to the
developing industrial economies of the countries within the region.16
China’s coast, bordering the South China Sea, has become
significantly more urban, thus giving rise to even more traffic.17
Assuming these countries will continue to grow economically, the
shipping lanes have the potential to become an escalating part of the
issue threatening the economic stability of the region.
If China were to take control of the South China Sea and impede
travel through the region, the impact would be felt worldwide. This
imposition would have severe economic consequences adversely
affecting the essential principle of free navigation. Free navigation is
paramount to ensure the most efficient outcome is reached when
trading and shipping internationally. Without free navigation, the
price of many necessary goods, in particular oil, would skyrocket in
price due to re-routing and other inefficiencies arising from the
nuisance.18 However, because free navigation is such a vital
component of the global economy, it seems unlikely that a country
would interfere with free navigation because it would also have an
undesirable effect on their economy.
The Natural Resources
The South China Sea is rich with natural resources, and so the
competitive interests between the countries have landed the sea’s
hydrocarbons at the crux of the dispute. The South China Sea has yet
to be exploited to the extent of many of the world’s other natural
resource locations, and therefore, remains relatively untapped.19 One
report by the World Bank estimates that in the South China Sea there
15.
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are nine hundred trillion cubic feet of natural gas and oil reserves,
equivalent to at least seven billion barrels.20 The vast amount of natural
resources available to the region has the potential to allow the
economies of the smaller nations of southeastern Asia to industrialize
and prosper. If smaller countries like Vietnam and the Philippines
were able to share in the profits from the natural resources, this could
have the potential to jumpstart their industry, and invigorate their
economies. The area in southeastern Asia is already booming, and
parts of southeastern Asia are going through an industrial revolution.21
The additional revenue from natural resources could help move along
industrialization and ensure economic stability in the region.
The hydrocarbons within the South China Sea are also valuable to
China. As China’s economy continues to grow and expand, the natural
resources in the area could provide the stability necessary to support
their vast industrialization.22 Chinese energy companies have already
started drilling in the disputed waters; in 2012, China’s National
Energy Administration named the South China Sea as a major source
for China’s natural gas production.23 Although there is much
discontent and hostility among the smaller southeastern Asian nations
against China, the disparity of economic and political capital leaves
little chance for negotiating fair terms to the region’s hydrocarbons.
Conclusion
The basic economics underlying the entire conflict is the necessity
of resources to facilitate industrialization in fisheries, shipping lanes,
and hydrocarbons, of which the South China Sea is an integral part of
that development.24 China has been able to harass and bully their way
into controlling the South China Sea because the countries of
southeastern Asia have insufficient resources to properly compete.
China’s ultimate goal is to force the disorganized,, smaller,
southeastern Asian countries into recognizing its claim to the area. The
best chance at a resolution to the South China Sea conflict would be
20.
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23.
24.
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XU, supra note 1.
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for Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and the other smaller
southeastern Asian countries to combine economic resources to rival
that of China’s. Although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) exists, it lacks the necessary organization and consolidated
nature to stand up to China.25 ASEAN’s economic and political
resources are inadequate to unite the people of the region under one
centralized influential organization.26 Thus, in order for ASEAN to be
a successful organization and an imposing force within the region,
ASEAN needs “to define clearer mandates, establish closer
coordination, and mobilize greater resources.”27 Until there is
communication and unity between the smaller southeastern Asian
nations, China will be able to impose their own economic agenda over
the South China Sea.
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